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A Social Problématique
Research in didactique of mathematics3 is founded on the
constructivist thesis from Piaget’s genetic epistemology:
“The hypothesis that the subject explores actively his or her
environment, and actively participates in the creation of
space, time, and causality.” (Inhelder & Caprona, 1985, p.
8). Likewise the subject, who for us is the student, actively
participates in the construction of his mathematical
knowings.4
These psychological bases are, however, insufficient for
at least two reasons. On the one hand because (the
acquisition of) mathematics5 requires the development of
situations that are specific to the nature and functioning of
the discipline. It is nowadays a truism to say that it is
impossible to expect the child to reconstruct mathematics
spontaneously from free interactions with his or her
environment: “There is no natural method for the teaching
of mathematics” (Brousseau, 1972). The development of
those learning situations requires above all else an
epistemological analysis in order to determine the suitable
conditions for the constitution of the meanings associated to
a given mathematical notion.
On the other hand, the psychological bases are
insufficient because the teaching of mathematics has a
social dimension that is revealed through two sorts of
constraints, one specific to the knowledge-to-be-learned
itself and the other r lated to the organization of the
knowledge taught:
· Mathematical knowledge has a very strong social
status. Students must acquire items of knowledge6
which are already known (and recognized as such) by
the society at large or by some of its divisions, and
which are being used by these groups. This constraint is
particularly obvious when one considers the learning of
notations and other means of representation that are
specific to a given item of mathematical knowledge.
· Even when it is agreed that what is at issue is the
learning of each individual student, the teacher also has
the responsibility of ensuring the homogeneity of the
construction of the items of knowledge and their
coherence at the level of the class in general. Without
that homogeneity, the didactical7 functioning of the
class would be impossible. As the constructivist
hypothesis entails that recourse to the authoritarian
imposition of a given item of knowledge is impossible,
such homogenization can only be produced in social
interaction. Brousseau (1972, 1981) has described the
fundamental forms that this social interaction can take
in the teaching of mathematics within the framework of
the theory of didactic situations.8
These two social dimensions place the teacher in a very
special position, at the junction of the system of societal
knowledge and the system of the items of knowledge
constructed in the classroom. And he or she has the
responsibility of ensuring the adequacy of the second system
in relation to the first. Moreover, the teacher has the
responsibility of ensuring that the functioning of the
knowledge and the intellectual productions of individuals
are regulated; the teacher can do that either by direct
intervention or by means of using some specific learning
situations.
This article addresses the study of phenomena related to
those social constraints on the didactic functioning in the
context of my research on pr of, and in particular on
mathematical proof. Elsewhere I have reported on a study
about the characterization of situations of validation. I
offered an analysis of the relations between the
characteristics of these situations and the nature of the
processes of proof used by students (Balacheff, 1987).9
These analyses had essentially addressed situations of
validation largely isolated from the teacher, that is to say
adidactical situations10 in the sense of Brousseau (1984). In
this paper I draw on the results of an experimental study
(Balacheff, 1988) to examine the didactic constraints
ttached to the social characteristics of didactic situations,
particularly the problem of the nature and means of their
regulation.
Genesis of a Conjecture and Devolution of the Problem
of Proving It
In order to illustrate my proposal, I have chosen a portion of
an experimental study that I conducted with 7th grade
students. The study dealt with the students’ construction of
the conjecture that the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180
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degrees and the devolution11 of the problem of proving this
conjecture. The d volution of the problem not only means
that each student makes it his or her own problem, but also
that the class as a whole recognizes the problem of proving
the conjecture and thereby adopts a collective responsibility.
This socialization is a necessary condition for the existence
of a proving debate as characteristic of a type of didactical
situation; it is the classroom community the one that is
engaged.12 Additionally, what is understood as c njecture in
this paper is more than a mere speculation or a statement
that is only plausible: The truth of the statement must be
perceived by the class as sufficiently interesting and
problematic that a process of ascertaining it is felt to be in
order by the class.
The cornerstone for the construction of this sequence is
the student’s conception that all measures associated with a
triangle increase as the size of the triangle increases. Such a
conception is known to be common among French seventh
grade students. The origin of this conception can probably
be found within the practices of measuring area or
perimeter, and actually holds for the usual geometric forms
in general. The conception leads to the following theorem-
in-action:13 “The larger a triangle, the bigger is the sum of
its angles.” Encountering a contradiction to this theorem-in-
action will become the source for the conjecture to be
constructed.14
The teacher is not to indicate the objective of the
sequence of activities at the beginning of their
implementation: If that were done, it would obviously run
the risk of losing the conjectural character of the target
proposition. Therefore, in designing the sequence it was
necessary for us to find conditions under which the measure
of the angles of a triangle and the manipulation of those
numbers could be introduced without rendering it necessary
to make explicit the learning objective that was being
sought. At the grade level where the experience was to take
place—the French equivalent to 7th grade—the lessons on
angles (as prescribed in the curriculum) constituted one
natural frame:. Activities that involved measuring angles in
a triangle could be easily introduced as a novelty because it
is normal for teachers to update situations by making them a
little bit more complex or changing the context. It did not
seem necessary to justify the introduction of the triangle in
any other way.
Within this frame, the first activity would require the
students to trace a triangle, measure its angles, and add up
the results obtained. The teacher would record the sums
from the class and draw a histogram on the board. Up to this
point all proposed results would be acceptable and should be
recorded by the teacher without noting anything special about
the differences. These differences do not have a particular
meaning: For example, they may appear normal for students
due to the fact that the sums correspond to different triangles.
In order to differentiate among the variety of results
obtained between those that relate to the uncertainty of
measurement and those that relate to students’ erroneous
conceptions, the whole class would then need to measure the
angles of the same given triangle. Student conceptions of the
rela io  between the size of a triangle and the sum of the
measures of its angles must also be called into play.
Thus, in the second activity each student would receive
an identical copy of a given triangle (without special
geometric characteristics), but sufficiently large in
comparison with the triangles that students usually trace in
order to engage the expected conceptions. The second
activity would ask students to predict the sum of the
measures of the angles of this triangle before determining
this number. Once each student has determined the sum of
the actual measurements, the teacher would record the sums
that each student has obtained and note them in a histogram
on the board. These results are compared with the
predictions and each student is asked to comment on the
comparison between his prediction and his result; then the
class is asked to comment on the histogram. The
require ent that each student comment on the comparison
between his or her prediction and the result obtained is
intended to underscore possible differences between these
two numbers. The requirement that the class comment on
the histogram aims at making explicit the necessity that all
the students should have obtained the same measurements
or the same triangle.15 The differences that would arise
would therefore be explained by the errors associated with
measur ment; errors related to the instruments or the
practice  of measurement.
The situation thus arising would have the characteristics
of a situation of action:16 It would permit the engagement of
conceptions that serve as models of action or of decision in
the succeeding activities, and hence it would support the
construction of the conjecture. Nevertheless, for the time
being, any difference noted between prediction and
m asurements would not be necessarily seen as problematic:
It could legitimately be seen as contingent, since it is related
to a particular choice of triangles.
T us f r in the development of the sequence only the
con itions for the genesis of the conjecture would have been
achiev d:
· student conceptions that would lead to the conjecture
would have been activated and the milieu within which
this genesis takes place would have been constituted;
· the uncertainty of the measurements would have been
noted, making possible to view knowing the sum of the
angles of a given triangle as problematic. The
disqualification of measurement as a way to determine
this sum would legitimize the requirement of
int llectual proofs17 or the expected conjecture.
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The third activity aims at enabling the formulation of the
problem of the invariance of the sum of the measures of the
angles of a triangle; eventually it aims at enabling the
emergence of the conjecture that states that this sum is equal
to 180 degrees.
To bring about the recognition of this invariance, it
would be necessary that the students perform actual
measurements and calculations for several triangles. But
these experiences would not have any special meaning
unless the students effectively engage their conceptions. The
conjecture and the requirement of proving it should arise at
the individual and at the classroom levels from a conflict
between two sets of conceptions: On the one hand those that
assert that the sum of the angles of a triangle depends on the
shape of the triangle, and on the other hand those that
support the empirical results of measurement that place this
sum in the neighborhood of 180 degrees.
Three triangles, like those shown in Figure 1, are
chosen for this activity, under the hypothesis that they
would enhance the probability of a conflict between conceptions.
On the one hand, triangles A and B are of sufficiently
uncommon shapes so that one could expect that which way
to predict the sums of the measures of their angles would
not be obvious. Rather, it would be expected that these
triangles would lead the students to nontrivial reasoning that
would engage their conceptions. On the other hand, triangle
C is notably smaller than the other triangles that students
are likely to have experienced so far, and hence it would
probably promote predictions that the sum is much less than
180 degrees.
To support the effective engagement of conceptions and the
emergence of cognitive conflict, the students’ activity should
be organized in teams. Each team should receive a copy of
the three triangles and would be required to agree on an a
priori evaluation of the sum of the angles for each triangle.
The requirement of this agreed-upon prediction for the
group would satisfy the theoretical conditions of a s tuation
of decision in which the confrontation of viewpoints is
supposed to lead to the proposal of explanations based on
the conceptions of each of the members. When this activity
is complete the teacher would be expected to collect and
record the results obtained in a histogram drawn on the
chalkboard. The collection of results is the opportunity for a
public discussion of contradictions between the results and
the predictons. This discussion is expected to underline possible
contradictions and encourage the spelling out of the
conceptions.
Imm diately following this discussion of the predictions
and results, the teacher would ask students whether, after
examining the three histograms and in the light of the
comm nts that have been offered, they have any particular
observations to make. Such a question might seem too open,
but the requirement that each triangle must have a precise
value for the sum of the magnitudes of its angles—which is
implicit in the question¾makes the question meaningful.
Th  problem of knowing this precise value must now be
osed18
My hypothesis is that the robustness of the initial
conceptions ensures that both positions in favor and against
the envisioned conjecture would have actual supporters in
the classroom. The students, in that case, would be in a
situation of validation, where they are bound to produce one
or more proofs19 of the conjecture or else refute it.
The design of the described sequence of activities is,
therefore, based on setting up a certain type of social
interaction that, eventually, would require the students to
take on responsibility for truth and, hence, to play a game
in which the teacher is to some extent disengaged from the
knowings. This type of social interaction can be described
by a set of rules—almost always implicit—that organizes
the exchanges among the students and between students and
teacher so as to permit the knowings to function in a certain
form¾i  this case, the form in which the knowings function
woul  be allowing the construction of a conjecture. This set
of rules constitutes the didactical contract in the sense of
Brou se u (1981).20
Custom of a Mathematics Classroom and Didactical
Contract
The pertinence of a concept of custom for didactical
analysis
I have observed the implementation of the sequence of
activities on the sum of the angles of a triangle in many 7th
grade classes. Two of these were videotaped (in March
1983 and in January 1984) and I have analyzed them in
detail relying on the complete transcriptions of the dialogues
(Balacheff, 1988). The two videotaped classes—referred as
D and E—present a particularly striking contrast of
practices. Important differences between the two classes
were noted in the negotiation of the didactical contract
specific to the situation: In class E this negotiation faced an
obstacle to be described below which I had previously
interpreted as resulting from the initial “standing” contract
for that class.
The differences between the classes were essentially
noted with respect to some rules of social functioning that
are described in the sequel. These rules concerned
A
C B
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mathematical activity and had been made explicit in class E
but not in class D. In fact, due to their very general legislative
character, those rules no longer appear to me as belonging
to the didactical contract but to a deeper and more enduring
order. The distinction between customary society and legal
society seemed to be a good model to account for and
analyze the difficulties encountered in the negotiation of a
didactical contract in class E and consequently the difficulties
associated with the devolution of the problem.
The classroom is a society of customs. Custom is
understood here as a set of obligatory practices
(Carbonnier, 1971) established as such by their use, and
which, in the majority of the cases, is established implicitly.
Custom regulates the way in which the social group expects
to establish relationships and interactions among its
members and, therefore, it is initially characterized as a
product of social practices. Within this framework, some
sociologists of law consider the explicit formulation of rules
as one of the mechanisms that allow a society of customs to
become a legal society:
What makes [customary and legal societies] different
is a technical fact: As we have seen, while custom is
spontaneous and ‘unconscious,’ law emanates from a
specialized organism and through a procedure that
within our present societies receives the name of
promulgation. (Levy-Bruhl, 1964, p. 55, my italics)
Certain properties of the didactical contract (Chevallard,
1983, p. 11) can be reformulated mu atis mutandis so as to
characterize custom. For example, in the same way as the
didactical contract becomes visible when it is broken, “one
only realizes the existence [of custom] when it produces its
effects” (Levy-Bruhl, 1964, p. 44).
However, the concept of contract as it has been
described in the literature up to now is insufficient to
account for the complete set of social phenomena that
regulate the functioning of knowledge in a class. For example,
the envisioned sequence of d v lutions to the students and
of resumptions by the teacher of the “responsibility for
truth” in the case of the sum of the angles of a triangle,
suggests a sequence of contracts that could imply an
instability that is not confirmed in the observation of actual
classes. Moreover, the problématique of the contract leads
one to ask about its origin, to identify the parts that hold the
contract, to determine the place and moment of its
negotiation, to estimate its duration. To the question “when
… who… has established the contract … instituted the
rules?” Chevallard responds: “It is always already done and
gone. (…) One subscribes to the contract when one enters
into the kind of social relationships that the contract
regulates” (1983, p. 11). The concept of custom is much
better adapted to account for the modes of regulation of the
social functioning in the class and at the same time it may
circumscribe the domain of validity of the concept of
didactical contract. It may also be possible that this
differentiation between contract (a notion that I see more as
having a local character and being a key element in the
process of devolution) and custom (a notion that I see as
regulating the social functioning of a given class across
time) will permit to do away with all the “misfortunes of the
concept of didactical contract” (Brousseau, 1984, p. 45).
Insofar as it is produced in and by practice, the custom
of a mathematics class is specific to the knowledge taught in
that class. This is clear, for example, with respect to what
constitutes a proof or the definition of “true.” I refer to “a
class” and not to “he class” because custom is specific to
each level of schooling. Thus, it is likely that the custom of
the 7th grade class will be different from that of the 8th grad
class. In France, mathematical proof is among the practices
of the 8th grade class. But before becoming a mathematical
object or a mathematical tool, mathematical proof is, for a
7th g ade student, this new thing that will have to be done
and to which the student will have to be initiated. This leads
us not so much to pose the question of the origins of the
custom as much as that of the initiation of students to the
custom of the class in which they enter. An initiation into a
sort of system of new “rights and duties [of subscribers to
an agreement] within the frame of a shared reference”
(Chevallard, 1983, p. 11).
In contrast, the didactical contract has a local character.
It is negotiated for a particular task that requires the rules
for the social functioning of the class to be defined locally
and in a new way. For example, the devolution to the class
of the responsibility for truth in the solution of a problem
where the student agrees to play a game with restrictions or
artificial characteristics that are nevertheless necessary for a
certain functioning of the knowledge (like the situations of
communication aforementioned or the impossibility of using
some material means). Custom matters at the moment of
negotiation of the didactical contract, in particular in
determining what is negotiable and what is not. When the
contract vanishes, the class comes back to its usual custom.
Agreed-Upon Response and Knowing
In the implementation of the sequence described above, I
observed with some regularity (across the various 7th grade
classes) the emergence of a norm, from the moment of the
analysis of the first measurements throughout the first
activity. This norm excludes measurements that lie far
outside the interval [170°, 190°], so that the announcements
of measurements such as 231° would provoke the
amusement of the class in general. The emergence of a norm
is confirmed by the increase of predictions of 180° in the
second activity, and moreover by the immense majority of
effected calculations that happen to yield 180°. This last
indicator is the most relevant because it entails that there
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had been a correction “towards 180°” of results initially
obtained.21 This does not mean, however, that the students
had acquired the idea that the sum of the angles of any
triangle would be 180°. For example, in class D, 21
students from a total of 25 “obtained” 180° for the proposed
triangle, but at the time of the third activity and after discussion,
some of them (12 students) stuck to a different value for one
of the three triangles. The conformism that is at the origin of
the first responses is essentially fragile because it is reached
under the initial imposition of producing “agreed-upon”
responses or assumed so by the students. But conformism
by itself cannot generate true knowings and thus it does not
allow the student to face a situ tion outside the frame in which
the agreement has been reached.
The emergence of a norm, phenomenon that was
observed in all classes, is probably not avoidable. The
source of the students’ identification of “acceptable”
responses after the first activity is most likely the effect of
an expectation that every classroom activity entails the
existence of expected behaviors or responses, reinforced by
“an ardent and unshakable desire to be in accord with the
group” which Watzlawick (1987, p. 88-95) has shown leads
to conformist behaviors.
I suggest that principles of this level of generality (such
as the injunction to find an agreed-upon solution so as to be
in accord with the group) which are involved in regulating
the activities of the class (as seen in the correction of
measures toward 180 degrees) should be considered within
the domain of the custom. Accordingly, I see custom
operating in the way that C evallard reserved for the
contract, i. e., custom “operates as a code, a generating
principle for some behaviors that are by the same token
defined as orthodox” (Chevallard, 1983, p. 11).
An Impossible Legal Society
One of the main misfortunes of the notion of didactical
contract as a fundamental concept for didactique seems to
be the idea that one should be able to make explicit as
thoroughly as possible a “good contract.” Such a “good
contract” would be made explicit to the students as defining
what is accepted with regard to their rights and duties, “a
sort of permanent object that should have been greed
upon” (Brousseau, 1984). But as Brousseau remarks, the
notion of didactical contract has nothing to do with that idea
of a “good contract”, because the didactical contract is
always (of necessity) invisible (p. 45). Everything happens
as if there was a contract, but that contract can never be
agreed upon a d whenever it is effectively agreed upon, it
cannot be enforced.
The model of custom should allow one to understand
and explain what could appear to be a paradox of the
contract: the necessary implicitness of its reality and the
necessity of its failing when spelled out. This failure
highlights the fact that the spelling out of the rules changes
the nature of the social interactions in the classroom. Just as
occurs in the passage from a customary society to a legal
society, the transformation is more than a simple technical
adjustment: It changes behaviors and therefore the meaning
of the items of knowledge constructed in the new frame are
als  changed.
My observations also show with relative clarity that the
pro sed situations, and hence the meaning of the behaviors
and productions of the students, are very sensitive to what
could be identified as the custom of the class in which these
situations are introduced. I had not envisioned such a central
role for custom a priori.
In class E the rules for debate had been explicitly
adopted. The students would state propositions that would
be written on the chalkboard in order to prove or refute
them; if a statement was proposed it was supposed to be
sufficiently general and interesting; if something was given
as proof, it should be recognized as convincing; it was not
improper for somebody to stick to the position of the
minority if unconvinced; etc. (See Capponi, 1985, for the
characterization of the general principles of this
organization.) Even though these rules permit the regulation
f social interaction, the rules themselves are a source of
difficulty for implementing of a genuine situation of proof.
In particular, a debate in which the proponents can
contradict each other is possible and to a large extent
legitimate by the explicit obligation to convince, but this,
together with the legality of holding a solitary position
r garding what is true, opens up the possibility of refusing
to be convinced. The spelling out of the rules has the
possible (and sometimes essential) consequence of causing
the emergence of a juridical void: In this case, the absence of
rules that would oblige one to admit to having been convinced.
Moreover, this legislation does not operate unless it is
kept under vigilance: Laws make judges necessary. To
satisfy the law might mean in the first place to satisfy the
judge. In this case, the existence of explicit rules, even
though envisioning a “scientific” way of working, could
provoke a drift toward the production of proofs or
arguments according to their capacity to satisfy the teacher
i stead of the intrinsic requirements of the problem of
validity. And this could occur in spite of the injunctions to
au onomy, since “the class” is not able to decide by itself on
the conformity of its own behaviors with the rules that have
been decreed. The class is not able to bypass the double role
of th  teacher as mediator and arbiter.
In any class, the teacher is always and completely
engaged in the situation; in this way, as Brousseau (1984)
r marks, the teacher is and remains accountable (p. 4). I
have observed that students may hold positions that are very
diff rent with respect to the validity of the property being
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addressed: There are those that know it already, those that
reject it, those that doubt about it, those that would be
willing to adopt the opinion of the majority, those that are
not interested. In opposition to a group of students that hold
the view that the sum of the angles of a triangle is invariant,
another group of students could claim that there exists a
particular case that does not verify the property, even if they
are not able to show which case that is. But this
problématique of proof and refutation cannot develop if a
very small minority holds one of the two positions: They
must be defended in a sufficiently balanced way so that an
authentic dialectic of validation will occur.22 For this to
occur, the teacher is responsible for encouraging the
supporters of each position equally.
The “truth” thus becomes problematic not because the
teacher does not take a position, but because the teacher
shows to be ready to support or provide a status both to the
thesis and the antithesis. The teacher provides a certain
status to uncertainty and at the same time underscores how
relevant it would be “to know.” This ensures that the
statement at stake is not just a mere speculation but a
conjecture. But this role for the teacher can not be assumed
by the teacher unless “the class” accepts it. The students
know that the teacher knows the answer, as usual, but the
negotiated contract allows the teacher to retreat from his
usual responsibilities of imparting knowledge. However, at
the end of this contract, everyone will recover his or her
position in relation to knowledge; the process of
institutionalization will indicate this has occurred. The
class, and the teacher with it, will return to ordinary custom
until the next contract needs to be negotiated so as to let
new knowings be put at work.
As a product of practices, custom evolves with those
practices. Custom is modified as long as learning progresses
and new mathematical practices appear. Some customary
rules will become obsolete during the school year, but also,
and more radically, the negotiation of the didactical contract
against the custom can create ruptures that boost the
meaning of a knowing by uncovering certain rules and their
relation to knowledge. The model of the contract and the
custom provides a framework for describing and explaining
both, the dynamic character of social interactions in class
inasmuch as they are related to knowledge, and the stability
and permanence of those social interactions that are
indispensable for the functioning of the didactic system.
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Notes
1 This article was originally published as “Le contrat et la coutume:
deux registres des interactions didactiques,” in C. Laborde (1988, Ed.),
Actes du premier colloque Franco-Allemand de didactique des
mathématiques et de l’informatique (pp. 11-26). Grenoble: La Pensée
Sauvage.
2 The editorial notes (EN) provide additional references and
clarification of the usage of certain terms for the English-speaking
audience. Translation notes (TN) are included as well. Otherwise, the
structure and content of the original paper has been kept as it was in
1988. It is expected that forthcoming pieces in English will further
clarify some conceptual aspects of the notions of contract and custom
that are alluded here. Many thanks to David Pimm, Jack Smith, and
most especially to Janet Barnett for useful conceptual and editorial
comments on a previous draft of the translation.
3Didactique of mathematics is the “science of the communication of
[mathematical] knowings and their transformations: an experimental
epistemology that aims at theorizing the production and circulation of
knowledge in a similar way as economics studies the production and
distribution of material goods” (Brousseau, 1990, p. 260, Herbst’s
translation). To avoid the unfortunate associations with the English
pejorative adjetive didactic, the original French noun didactique is
adopted as a neologism. (EN)
4Knowing is hereafter used as a noun to translate the French
connaissance, whereas knowledge is reserved to translate the French
savoir. Knowings are the results of the cognitive adaptation of a subject
to a milieu. The interaction provides for the situated nature of the
knowings—in terms of contextualization, personalization, and
temporalization (see Herbst, 1998, pp. 34-38). Balacheff, Cooper,
Sutherland, and Warfield (in Brousseau, 1997) say that “[knowings]
refer to intellectual cognitive constructs, more often than not
unconscious; [knowledge] refers to socially shared and recognized
cognitive constructs, which must be made explicit” (p. 72). (TN)
5To bypass fashionable ideological disputes about acquisition and
mathematics, it is hereafter assumed that mathematics education as a
social project at least demands the students’ acquisition of
mathematics—understood in a broad sense as the practices and
discourse historically developed by working mathematicians. (EN)
6An item of knowledge is the chosen translation for the French (un)
savoir, and its plural, items, for (des) savoirs. Knowledge is used to
translate (le) savoir. (TN)
 7The didactical functioning of the class is the functioning of the class as
a system whose goal is for the teacher to transmit and for the students
to acquire some culturally recognizable items of knowledge. (EN)
 8 See Brousseau (1997). (EN)
 9 See also Balacheff (1988b). (EN)
 10An adidactical situation is one in which the student is enabled to use
some knowings to solve a problem “without appealing to didactical
reasoning [and] in the absence of any intentional direction [from the
teacher].” (Brousseau, 1997, p. 30; see also Kieran, 1998). (EN)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11The notion of devolution is taken from Brousseau (1997) to mean
“the act by which the teacher makes the student accept the
responsibility for an (adidactical) learning situation or for a problem,
and accepts the consequences of this transfer of this responsibility” (p.
230). (EN)
 12The classroom community is the community engaged in debating the
common system of validation against which a given explanation will be
compar d to decide whether this explanation counts as proof. “We call
proof an explanation accepted by a given community at a given moment
of time. The decision to accept it can be the object of a debate whose
principal objective is to determine a common system of validation for
t e speakers” (Balacheff, 1987, p. 147, Herbst’s translation). (EN)
 13The notion of theorem-in-action is taken from Vergnaud’s (1996)
theory of conceptual fields. “A theorem-in-action is a proposition that is
held to be true by the individual subject for a certain range of the
situation variables (…). The scope of validity of a theorem-in-action
can be different from the real theorem (…). A theorem-in-action can be
false.” (p. 225). (EN)
 14See also Balacheff (1990). (EN)
 15The istogram is neither an instrument for the correction of actual
individual measures nor a way to produce a correct measure by
aggregation of those individual measures. Rather, the practice of
producing a histogram is a condition that permits all independent
(individual) measuring practices to be associated into a single practice
(that of measuring the same triangle), hence enabling the emergence of
the problematic character of such measuring. (EN)
 16See Brousseau (1997) pp. 65-66. (EN)
17Fo  an explanation of intellectual proofs in contrast with pragmatic
proof  see Balacheff (1987, 1988b). (EN)
18Recall that the class must pose the problem. This open question could
create the opportunity for the problem to be posed at this point. (EN)
19Proof is the chosen English translation for the French preuve and
corresponds to the acceptance of an explanation by a community (see
note 15). Balacheff (1987) addresses the distinction between proofs
(Fr. preuves) and mathematical proofs (Fr. demonstrations) as follows:
“Within the mathematical community, only those explanations that
adopt a particular form can be accepted as proof. They are sequences of
statements organized according to determined rules: A statement is
either known to be true or deduced from those that precede it using a
rule of deduction from a set of well-defined rules. We call these sorts
of proofs mathematical proofs” (p. 148). (EN)
20The idactical contract is the “system of reciprocal obligations
[between teacher and student that] resembles a contract [and] which is
specific to the ‘content’, the target mathematical knowledge.”
(Brousseau, 1997, pp. 31-32). (EN)
21The em rgence of a norm is a rational hypothesis that, insofar as it
entails that actual measurements would be “corrected toward 180º,”
helps the researcher understand why, in fact, the announcement of 231º
would be deemed amusing by the students and why the bets on 180º
would increase. (EN)
22See Brousseau (1997) pp. 69-72. (EN)
